Every year on July 26, India honours the soldiers who gave their lives in the Kargil War by observing Kargil Vijay Diwas. Without a doubt, the conflict illustrates high-altitude fighting in hilly terrain and poses substantial logistical challenges for the opposing parties. In the conflict, the Indian Army launched “Operation Vijay” in 1999 to retake Indian territory from Pakistani invaders in the Kargil-Drass region. The Indian Army’s “Operation Vijay” mission, which the Indian Air Force dubbed “Operation Safed Sagar,” was ultimately successful for India.
On May 8, 1999, the Pakistani army and militants from Kashmir were discovered at the top of the Kargil ridges, sparking the Kargil War. Pakistan is thought to have started preparing for the operation in the autumn of 1998.
The Kargil War was divided into three main phases. First, Pakistan gained many critical high points in the Kashmir region that was under Indian control. Second, in retaliation, India first took control of vital supply lines, then used force to drive Pakistani forces back across the Line of Control.
By June 30, 1999, Indian forces were ready to launch a significant high-altitude offensive against Pakistani border checkpoints in the disputed Kashmir area. India has sent 44 paramilitary battalions, 5 independent brigades, and 5 infantry divisions to Kashmir during the previous six weeks. Indian troops numbering approximately 730,000 had arrived in the area. The build-up also involved the dispatch of about 60 frontline aircraft.
Illegal Encroachment by Pakistan!
The Pakistani attempt to seize Kargil happened after the February Lahore Summit in 1999 between Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India. The tensions that had existed since May 1998 were thought to have decreased as a result of this summit. The operation’s primary goal was to aid in the internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute, whose interest had been waning for some time.
The strategy of intrusion is reported to have been the creation of Lt. Gen. Mohammed Aziz, the Chief of General Staff, and Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan. They only received an ‘in principle agreement from Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister of Pakistan, without any further details.
The Pakistani military’s primary goal in carrying out the intrusions was to take advantage of the significant defence vulnerabilities in the sector on both the Indian and Pakistani sides of the Line of Control (LoC). Very few routes led from the main roads into the LoC due to the incredibly rough terrain there. Additionally, the terrain is heavily blanketed with snow during the winter, which makes transportation nearly difficult.
By the end of May or the beginning of June, Zoji La, the only mountain pass that formerly connected the Kargil region to the Kashmir Valley, will open. Therefore, manoeuvring via Srinagar before that time would not have been possible. Furthermore, the Pakistani Army anticipated that even if the intrusions were found by the Indians in early May, as they were, the Indian Army’s response would be slow and restricted, giving them more time and enabling them to consolidate the intrusions more successfully.
As a result, only Zoji La was made available for the induction of troops in early May. If the intrusion were successful, Pakistani troops would be able to secure some commanding heights from which the Srinagar-Leh National Highway 1A might be blocked at various locations. The Indian Army reserves will also be drawn in and constrained by the invasions. Additionally, the incursions have given Pakistan authority over vast areas of strategically important land across the LoC, giving Islamabad a strong negotiating position. And they radically change the LoC’s status.
In addition to keeping the plot a secret, the Pakistan Army took some actions to maximise deception and handle a component of surprise. No new administrative bases for the intrusions were to be built; instead, those already present within the current defences were to be used to accommodate them. The logistical lines of communication ran up the ridgelines, therefore the nullahs were located far from the railway tracks and the Indian Army men had already taken up positions there.
The plan was finalised and implemented near the end of April. To carry out numerous invasions along the ridgelines and occupy dominant heights, the main groups were divided into several smaller subgroups, each consisting of 30 to 40 people. The Pakistani army was attempting to take control of the conflict in Kashmir, engulfing the Indian subcontinent in a limited-duration conflict, and heightening the possibility of nuclear war.
Recognition of the Intruders (the Pakistanis)!
Indian Army Patrols on Kargil Hills find intruders between May 8 and 15, 1999. The participation of trained Mujahideen and Pakistani Army regulars in these operations in the areas east of Batalik and north of Dras was established by the infiltration pattern.
Pakistan used artillery from across the border to fire on general areas of Kargil and Dras. The Indian army carried out several operations that were successful in cutting off the infiltrators in the Drass sector. Additionally, the infiltrators in the Batalik sector were pushed back.
The invaders on the heights included the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 12th battalions of the Pakistan Army’s Northern Light Infantry (NLI), as well as both professional soldiers and mercenaries. They included many Mujahedin and personnel of Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG). At first, it was thought that 500 to 1000 intruders were inhabiting the heights, but later it was thought that there may have been as many as 5000 of them.
The 160 Km-long intrusion zone covered a large area. To ensure that the invaders across the LoC would have access to supplies from the facilities in the POK, the Army of Pakistan established a sophisticated logistical network. The Pigs (Pakistanis or, the Intruders) were well-armed with modern arsenal such as AK-47, AK-56, Anti-Aircraft Guns, Artillery and Stinger Missiles!
Operation Vijay – Beginning of the Indian Army’s Onslaught!
The Indian Army discovered the incursions between May 3 and May 12. Military actions were planned from May 15 to May 25, 1999, and troops, artillery, and other equipment were transferred to their attack areas. Additionally, the necessary equipment was also acquired. ‘Operation Vijay’ was a mission that the Indian Army initiated in May 1999. Now, with aircraft and helicopter air support, the Indian troops advanced towards the seized Pakistani positions.
The 1999 Indian Army Operation Vijay was a joint Infantry-Artillery effort to drive out Northern Light Infantry (NLI) regular Pakistani soldiers who had crossed the Line of Control into Indian territory and had encircled unoccupied mountain summits at high altitudes and ridgelines. It quickly became apparent that the sangars of the intruders could only be destroyed with heavy, sustained fire. This marked the start of a unique saga in the use of artillery firepower in combat.
After several weeks of conflict, Tololing in the Drass sub-sector was finally taken on June 13, 1999, becoming the first significant ridgeline to do so. Over a hundred artillery batteries, mortars, and rocket launchers engaged in persistent fire attacks before the onslaught. The enemy was prevented from interfering with the assault by thousands of shells, bombs, and rocket warheads that created havoc. The 155 mm Bofors medium guns and the 105 mm Indian field artillery engaged in direct fire, destroying all discernible enemy sangars and compelling them to retreat from various locations.
The conquest of the Tololing complex prepared the door for a series of assaults to be launched from different angles on the Tiger Hill complex. Point 4875 and Tiger Hill were retaken on July 4-5, 1999. On July 7, 1999, Mashkoh Valley was retaken. To the west of Tiger Hill was another commanding feature of Tiger Hill.
Point 4875 was renamed “Gun Hill” in recognition of the Gunners’ outstanding performance in the Drass and Mashkoh sub-sectors. The fact that about 12,000 rounds of highly explosive ammunition fell on Tiger Hill and caused widespread destruction and fatalities is interesting to note! 122mm Grad multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs) were used in direct combat.
The Batalik Sector had significantly more difficult terrain and a much more well-entrenched adversary. The containment fight lasted for over a month. On commanding heights, artillery observation posts (OPs) were established, and day and night, persistent artillery fire was rained down on the enemy, preventing them from getting any rest.
Point 5203 was taken back on June 21, 1999, while Khalubar was taken back on July 6, 1999. The remaining Pakistani posts in the Batalik sub-sector became the target of more attacks over the following several weeks. Once more, the enemy’s supplies and battalion infrastructure were destroyed thanks in large part to artillery.
According to reports, the Indian Artillery fired around 250,000 rounds, bombs, and rockets during the Kargil battle. Approximately 5,000 artillery shells, mortar bombs, and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars, and MBRLs. It is also said that since the Second World War, such high rates of fire over such extended times have not been seen anywhere in the world.
Decimating the enemy from above – Indian Airforce into Action!
From May 11 to May 25, ground forces with the assistance of the air force attempted to neutralise the danger, assess the positions of the enemy’s formations, and perform several pre-emptive operations. The Air Force’s participation in battle on May 26 marked a paradigmatic shift in the nature and outlook of the conflict. Do you know that for 50 or so days of operations, the Air Force conducted around 5000 sorties of various kinds?
The Western Air Command carried out the three-week-long exercise Trishul before Kargil. During Trishul, the Indian Air Force targeted targets at high altitudes in the Himalayas while flying 5,000 sorties with 300 aircraft and about 35,000 soldiers. IAF claimed to have flown over 550 sorties in Kargil, although only about 80 of those were on or near the target.
There was no denying that shoulder-fired missiles were a constant menace. A Pakistani Stinger may have crossed the Line of Control to injure an IAF Canberra reconnaissance aircraft. Due to enemy shoulder-fired missiles on the second and third days of the operation, the IAF lost one MiG-21 jet and one Mi-17 helicopter. Additionally, one MiG-27 was destroyed by engine failure on the second day soon after the pilot had launched effective attacks on one of the enemy’s supply caches.
The IAF’s tactics of carrying out strikes from outside the Stinger SAM perimeter and avoiding the use of helicopters for attack purposes were reinforced by these occurrences. Attack helicopters are somewhat useful in operations while the environment is reasonably benign, but they are very vulnerable in a hostile battlefield. The enemy had launched over 100 shoulder-fired SAMs at IAF aircraft, which on the one hand indicates the effectiveness of the enemy air defences in the region but on the other hand highlights the effectiveness of IAF tactics, particularly after the first three days of the conflict when not a single aircraft suffered even a scratch.
The elevation in the Kargil region is from 16,000 to 18,000 feet above sea level. And the plane needed to fly at a height of almost 20,000 feet. The air is 30% less dense at these altitudes than it is at sea level. Because the radius of a turn is larger than it is at lower heights, this has the effect of reducing the weight that can be carried as well as the capacity to manoeuvre.
The valley’s narrow breadth makes it harder to move around because of the turn’s biggest radius. Due to the lower volume of air entering the fighter or helicopter’s jet engine, the engine’s performance also suffers. The unusual air density has an impact on the trajectory of weaponry as well. As a result, the shooting might not be precise. The targets in the mountains are dispersed, somewhat small, and challenging to see visually, especially for pilots of fast planes.
The two Indian airfields that were closest to Kargil were Srinagar and Avantipur. Additionally, Adampur in the vicinity of Jalandhar was close enough to aid air operations. So, these three locations were where the IAF was based. The aircraft utilised for ground attack were the MiG-2I, MiG-23, MiG-27, Jaguar, and Mirage-2000. MiG-21 was created primarily for air interception with a secondary function for ground attack.
It could so operate in confined areas, which were crucial in the Kargil terrain. MiG-23s and MiG-27s were modified for ground attacks. They can each carry a load of 4 tonnes and may contain a variety of weaponry, including guns, rocket pods, free-fall, retarded, and smart bombs. Additionally, it includes a computerised bombsight for precise weapon delivery. These aircraft were perfect for usage in this kind of terrain.
On May 27, while flying a MiG-27 and engaging a target in the Batalik sector, Flight Lt. Nachiketa experienced engine failure and had to make a forced landing. Sqn Ldr Ajay Ahuja, flying a MiG-21, set out to find the downed pilot, and while doing so, he was struck by a Pakistani surface-to-surface air missile (SAM). He was able to escape without injury, but his body was later returned with gunshot wounds.
Modern Mirage-2000s were utilised for electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and ground attack. This fighter fires its armaments with pinpoint precision. additionally carried devastating laser-guided and free-fall bombs. The Pakistani bunkers on the hills at Tiger Hill and Muntho Dhalo suffered significant destruction as a result of this weapon. There were reportedly 180 injuries among Pakistani forces at Muntho Dhalo during the Mirage raid.
The slower helicopter gunship proved crucial to engage Pakistani objectives in the valleys and on peaks. The Mi-17 was also modified to carry four rocket pods that could fire air-to-ground rockets, and it was successful in taking out Pakistani troops and bunkers. One helicopter and its crew perished while attacking Point 5140 on May 28 in the Tololing region due to a counter-heat-seeking missile.
It should be remembered that the Air Force was prohibited from crossing the Line of Control (LoC) to the Pakistani side. Otherwise, the Pakistani supply lines and logistical depots on both sides of the Line of Control would have been destroyed or the Indian Air Force would have had the freedom to do so.
These assaults, though, targeted Pakistani targets on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Supply routes, logistical hubs, and strongholds of the opposition were destroyed. The Indian Army was able to move on with its operations quickly and with fewer casualties as a result.
It is reported that air action alone killed 700 invaders during Operation Vijay. The effectiveness of IAF attacks has been revealed by the Indian Air Force’s interception of numerous hostile wireless signals. As a result, we may assert that no war in recent memory has been won without command over the air space in which operations are carried out.
Operation Talwar – The Naval Counter-Offensive!
While the Indian Army and Air Force prepared for the combat on the Kargil Heights, the Indian Navy started to formulate its strategy. The Indian goal was to prevent Pakistan from escalating the crisis into a full-fledged war by whatever means necessary. Thus, a few days before the start of the Indian retaliatory strike, the Indian Navy was placed on full alert starting on May 20. As a result of constant surveillance, naval and coast guard aircraft are prepared to handle any maritime situation.
It was now vital to apply pressure on Pakistan, and the proper message needed to reach the leaders of that nation. Strike units from the Eastern Fleet proceeded up the East Coast from Visakhapatnam to participate in the massive naval exercise “SUMMEREX” in the North Atlantic Ocean. This was planned to be the biggest naval ship amassing in the area.
This point was hammered home, and the Pakistan Navy issued a defensive order ordering all of its units to avoid Indian Naval ships. All of Pakistan’s significant combatants were evacuated from Karachi, and the drill was moved closer to the Makran Coast. Additionally, it changed its direction to defend its Gulf oil commerce from the other invaders!
Naval attention has since switched to the Gulf of Oman as the Indian Army and Air Force’s counterattack gained momentum and Pakistan’s loss appeared to be within striking distance. For missile fire, anti-submarine, and electronic warfare training exercises, a variety of ships from the navy and units carrying fast-reaction missiles were sent to the North Arabian Sea. Additionally, the Navy prepared itself to impose a blockade on Pakistani ports should the need arise.
Additionally, the Naval forces relocated from the Andaman group of islands to the western seaboard. The “Eastern Fleet” joined the “Western Naval Fleet” as part of “Operation Talwar” to prevent Pakistan’s access to the Arabian Sea. The previous prime minister Nawaz Sharif revealed that Pakistan had only six days’ worth of gasoline (POL) to last itself if a full-fledged war had started because of the Indian Navy’s formidable blockade. This is how the Indian Navy contributed significantly to the Kargil War and supported the Indian Army and Air Force.
The bravery, passion, and dedication shown by soldiers and young officers during the Kargil War were the only things that made the glory of victory possible. The junior leadership and esprit de corps were on full display. The Kargil War will undoubtedly go down in military history as a tale of unmatched bravery, boldness, devotion, and tenacity. As a result, every year on July 26, Kargil Vijay Diwas is observed to honour the triumph over Pakistan. A huge tribute from ‘The Aesthetic Bharat’ to the magnanimous Indian Army and their valour, gallantry and divine sacrifices for the nation!
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